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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the development and transformation of the People’s Republic of  
China (PRC)’s financial system since the start of economic and financial reforms in 1978.  
It describes how despite the rapid development of capital markets since the 1990s, the 
PRC’s financial system continues to be dominated by bank lending. Reforms have not 
eliminated the credit expansion impetus of large commercial banks, while the effectiveness 
of capital-based constraints and administrative measures is far below potential. Large state-
owned banks have become important players in bond and equity markets, as well as 
important sources of liquidity provision for smaller commercial banks and a range of non-
bank financial institutions through a combination of inter-bank funding activities, wealth 
management products and shadow banking/grey capital market activities. The importance of 
non-bank financial institutions has also continued to grow. Off-shore markets have increased 
the overseas holdings of financial assets, but their potential remains limited by capital 
controls and the fragility of the domestic financial system. An unintended consequence of 
this is that although the PRC’s state run financial system has become more complex and 
more interconnected domestically, foreign participation remains low. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After close to two decades of financial sector reform, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC)’s financial system is now a participant in the global financial system in a way 
that other large Asian economies such as Japan and India have never been. Its banks 
and insurance companies rank among the world’s largest. Yet despite remarkable 
growth, the PRC’s policy makers continue to grapple with questions over how to best to 
make the financial system serve the real economy. 
Figure 1: New IMF Measures of Financial Development  
for the People’s Republic of China, 1982–2014 
 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from Svirydzenka (2016). 
According to a new composite index of financial development constructed by the IMF, 
the PRC has witnessed significant development since the early 1980s (Figure 1). 
However, efficiency especially in large state-owned banks has declined, the level of 
non-performing loans is rising and bank profit margins have deteriorated, all of which 
affect financial stability, which remains a significant challenge. A further challenge is 
enhancing financial inclusion, which continues to be a key policy priority as expressed 
in the PRC’s 13th Five Year Plan for the period 2016–2020. As pointed out by Justin 
Lin, “[t]here is a mismatch between the PRC’s real economy and the financial system. 
The country’s real economy is largely comprised of farmers, small and medium-sized 
businesses, and yet the financial sector is dominated by big banks that prefer to deal 
with big companies” (quoted from Tsai, 2015: 1). While small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) account for more than 97% of registered industrial firms, employ almost 65% of 
the workforce and generate 60% of the PRC’s GDP, state-owned commercial banks 
extend over 75% of loans to larger state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Tsai, 2015). 
Access to credit continues to be a major constraint facing SMEs. According to a 2012 
survey in 15 provinces, 57.5% of SMEs had obtained funding through informal credit 
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markets (Li and Hu, 2013). Recent estimates put the size of the PRC’s shadow banking 
system at 138% of GDP for May 2017 (Shih, 2017).1 Many rural counties lack access 
to adequate banking services, and private enterprises face punitively high interest 
rates. Accordingly, the lack of access to finance is a key issue, which also undermines 
financial stability due to the rise of the shadow banking system. 
Despite the rapid development of capital markets since the 1990s, the PRC’s financial 
system continues to be dominated by bank lending (Figures 2 and 3). Reforms have 
not eliminated the credit expansion impetus of large commercial banks, while the 
effectiveness of capital-based constraints and administrative measures is far below 
potential. However, the importance of non-bank financial institutions has continued to 
grow, and the system is characterized by an increasing interconnectedness between 
various components. Banks have not only become important players in bond and 
equity markets, they are also closely linked with the rapid growth of off-balance sheet 
finance. Importantly, through a combination of inter-bank funding activities, wealth 
management products and shadow banking/grey capital market activities, large-state 
owned banks have become important sources of liquidity provision to both smaller 
commercial banks and a range of non-bank financial institutions. An unintended 
consequence of this is that the PRC’s state run financial system has become more 
complex and more interconnected. This has amplified the case for a more diverse 
financial system, better capable of limiting potential contagion from counterparty risk. 
Figure 2: Total Finance as % of GDP, 2015 
 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from the World Bank Financial 
Development Index Database. 
  
                                                
1  Sheng and Soon (2016) put the size of the PRC’s shadow banking system at 51% of GDP at the end  
of 2014. 
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Figure 3: Overview of the People’s Republic of China’s Financial System 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, building on Ping (2015). 
The PRC leadership has shown a willingness to tolerate this insofar as it serves the 
PRC’s immediate development needs. However, the maintenance of large balance 
sheets, which tends to make counterparties believe that being “too big to fail” implies 
financial stability, represents a welfare loss for society. These costs have been 
reflected in the direction of reforms, which since 2006 have focused on making the 
banking sector serve the real economy by increasing the level of financial diversity and 
reducing the asset share of large state-owned banks. These include: 
• The extension of a pilot scheme in 2006 effectively removing geographical 
restrictions on the operations of foreign banks in rural areas as part of the policy 
of Constructing a New Socialist Countryside (jianshe shehuizhuyi xin nongcun). 
• Since 2007, China Post and Savings Bank engages in commercial lending. 
• Removal of the interest rate lending floor in 2013, an effective subsidy to  
state-owned banks. 
• The abolition of the deposit interest rate ceiling and a relaxation of loan to 
deposit ratio restrictions in 2015. 
• Proposals to extend mixed ownership to banks as a way of introducing  
non-state capital into the financial system and improving ownership diversity. 
• Pilot schemes to increase the overseas holdings of domestic equities and 
bonds 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of the PRC’s financial governance framework. This is followed by outlines of 
the development of the PRC’s banking sector, equities markets, and bond markets in 
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Sections 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 provides a brief overview of the rapidly 
developing fintech market, which is followed by a short outline of exchange rate 
management and the opening of the PRC’s financial sector in Section 7. Section 8 
concludes and briefly touches on current developments and challenges. 
2. FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) was created in 1948 under the leadership of the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF). With the “Socialist Transformation” of the PRC economy 
along the model of the Soviet Union’s centrally planned economy in 1951, the PRC 
introduced a mono-bank financial system. The PBC became essentially the country’s 
sole financial institution (besides credit cooperatives operating at the township level) 
and fulfilled at the same time the roles of a central bank and commercial bank.2 Given 
the lack of commercial banks or financial markets, there was effectively no financial 
regulation (Huang, 2010). 
Following the start of economic and financial reforms in 1978, the mono-bank system 
was dismantled and new banks were established. In 1979, the PBC was separated 
from the MoF and granted the authority of a central bank. Over time, it developed  
into the regulator and supervisor for the entire financial system, including banking, 
securities and insurance. As these sectors developed rapidly over time, the PRC 
adopted a sectors-based regulatory model in the early 1990s, with dedicated regulators 
for banking, securities and insurance (Huang, 2010). In 1992, the State Council 
Securities Commission (SCSC) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) were tasked with supervising and regulating the issuance and trading of 
securities on the stock exchanges. The SCSC was subsequently integrated into the 
CSRC, which in 1998 became the singular authority to regulate the securities market. 
The same year, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) was established 
to exercise oversight over the insurance sector. 
In 1998, the Central Financial Work Commission (CFWC) was created in response to 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Although the crisis did not directly affect the PRC, which at 
the time still maintained tight capital controls, the Communist Party of China (CCP) 
realized the danger of financial crisis and hence sought to exert greater control over the 
financial sector (Heilmann, 2005). The CFWC was created to this end, with direct and 
exclusive reporting responsibility to the CCP’s Central Committee (Pistor, 2012). The 
CFWC was abolished in 2002 and in 2003 the newly established China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) assumed responsibilities for banking regulation from 
the PBC and the CFWC. 
With a central bank charged with monetary and exchange rate policies and three 
specialized supervisory agencies – collectively referred to as Yihang Sanhui  
(“one bank, three commissions”) – the PRC thus adopted a formal governance regime 
for its financial sector that resembled the regulatory structure found in many developed 
Western market economies at the time (Huang, 2010; Pistor, 2012). The PBC and the 
three regulatory authorities are subordinate to the State Council. In practice, the PBC 
retained an important role in banking supervision and maintained a powerful voice in 
strategic discussions over the direction of financial reforms (Pistor, 2012). 
                                                
2  Over time, a number of banks were established but later abandoned or integrated into the PBC, 
including the Agricultural Cooperative Bank (established in 1951) and the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC) (established in 1955). 
ADBI Working Paper 825 Tobin and Volz 
 
5 
 
Strategic decisions on financial sector reforms have been taken by the Leading Group 
for Financial and Economic Affairs, a body under the CCP Central Committee that was 
established by the CCP Politburo Standing Committee in 1980. It is led by either the 
CCP General Secretary or the Premier of the State Council and generally considered 
the most powerful entity in matters of economic and financial governance. Decisions on 
the strategic direction of financial market reforms have been also set by the National 
Financial Work Conference, which has convened twice a decade since the inaugural 
conference in 1997. Its participants have included high-ranking government officials, 
central bankers and regulators from the national and provincial level, as well as 
representatives from the headquarters and provincial branches of all major banks, 
insurance firms and nonbank-financial firms (Lardy, 1998). 
Following the fifth National Financial Work Conference in July 2017, President Xi 
announced the creation of a cabinet-level committee to coordinate financial oversight  
to overcome the fragmentation of financial regulation (Bloomberg, 2017). He also 
announced a bigger role for the PBC in managing financial market risks. The new 
Financial Stability and Development Committee, which is headed by the Vice Premier, 
was established under the State Council in November 2017. The committee’s office will 
be based at the PBC. Its remit is to supervise the PRC’s monetary policy and financial 
regulation. It will have the authority to supervise and interrogate financial regulators 
and local governments (SCMP, 2017a). A further change to the regulatory structure 
was proposed in March 2018 at the National People’s Congress, including a merger  
of the CBRC and the CIRC, and transfer of greater responsibilities for drafting key 
regulations and prudential oversight to the PBC. 
An important element of financial governance in the PRC has been the control of state 
ownership of publicly owned financial institutions. The MoF and Central Hui Jin 
Investment Ltd. (Hui Jin) have been the two most important state entities with large 
ownership stakes in the financial sector (Pistor, 2012). Hui Jin was established in 2003 
with a mandate to “to exercise the rights and the obligations as an investor in major 
state-owned financial enterprises, on behalf of the State” (Hui Jin, 2018).3 Hui Jin has 
been authorized by the State Council to make “equity investments in major state-
owned financial enterprises” and “exercise the rights and perform the obligations as an 
investor on behalf of the State in accordance with applicable laws, to achieve the goal 
of preserving and enhancing the value of state-owned financial assets” (Hui Jin, 2018). 
Pistor (2012) highlights that formal governance structures for the financial sector have 
been effectively superseded by informal governance structures which are controlled  
by the CCP. In particular, she points to the role of the CCP Central Organization 
Department, which not only appoints senior executives of the PRC’s four regulatory 
authorities (PBC, CBRC, CSRC, CIRC) but also of all major financial institutions. 
3. EVOLUTION OF THE BANKING SECTOR 
The start of reform of the PRC’s mono-banking system coincided with major upheavals 
in international finance. These included the collapse of the Bretton Woods system  
in 1973, an increase in competition from non-bank financial institutions and the 
                                                
3  Hui Jin was initialy a subsidiary of the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), the 
administrative agency of the PBC responsible for foreign exchange management. In 2007, the MoF 
aquired all shares in Hui Jin from the PBC, whoch was compensated with specially issued treasury 
bonds. The MoF then injected the shares in Hui Jin into China Investment Corporation (CIC), the PRC’s 
new sovereign wealth fund which was created the same year. Hui Jin has been a wholly owned 
subsidiary of CIC since. Hui Jin’s shareholder rights are exercised by the State Council. 
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emergence of global money center banks. The backdrop of these events meant that as 
early as the 1980s, the PRC leadership had developed an intricate understanding  
of the relationship between large banks and financial stability. That said, official and 
independent scholarly accounts give relatively scant attention to the early role of banks 
in the PRC’s economic take-off (Goodstadt, 2012). Many studies have focused on the 
role of informal finance in sustaining the growth of the non-state sector (Allen, Qian and 
Qian, 2005). Lardy (2002: 128–29) argued that the adjustment of the PRC’s financial 
system was not inhibited by tariff rates or other protections; rather by the ability  
of money losing state-owned firms to continue to avoid their losses. Against this 
background, this section examines why after almost two decades of reorganization and 
institutional reform of the financial system – which arguably did not really begin until the 
early 2000s following the non-performing loans (NPL) crisis –, the PRC’s state-banks 
rank among the largest in the world, while at the same time the ability of loss making 
SOEs to sustain their position appears unchecked. 
Figure 4: Stages of Reforms in the Banking Sector 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: Compiled by the authors, drawing partly on Okazaki (2017: 305). 
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Figure 4 provides a summary of major reforms in the PRC’s financial system since 
1978. These have to a large extent attempted to mirror developments in international 
banking. Large state banks have structured themselves along these lines of modern 
corporations, launched initial public offerings (IPOs), appointed non-executive 
directors, and sold minority shareholding to foreign banks (Sun and Tobin, 2005). 
Significantly this approach was not new to the PRC, and its origins can be traced to the 
period 1911–1935 where semi-private and private banks were formed with limited 
liability and shareholders (Cheng, 2003). These banks mirrored their international 
counterparts in that they not only enjoyed limited liability, but also had long-serving high 
profile chief executives known as the Jiangzhe Caifa. These financial magnates 
enjoyed strong relationships with both Shanghai’s capitalists and the government. The 
period also saw the emergence of grassroots financial institutions, the qianzhuang  
and diandang, which share similarities with contemporary informal lending institutions  
(He et al., 2017). 
This train of development was interrupted by civil war and the subsequent foundation  
of the PRC in 1949. In 1950, a decree effectively signaled the communist takeover  
of the government shares in the semi-private banks and was followed by the 
establishment of a CCP appointed board of directors and supervisory board (Cheng, 
1954). The Agricultural Bank of China was reformed in 1963 (having been abolished in 
1957) with the objective of coordinating the finances of collectives and the rural credit 
cooperatives at the local level. 4  The PRC maintained a link with the international 
financial system via the overseas branches of the Bank of China which had the 
objective of maximizing foreign exchange earnings to fund socialist construction (Tobin, 
2016). In 1979, following the launch of the “open door” policies, the PRC established or 
re-opened three state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs): the Agricultural Bank of 
China, the Bank of China and the Construction Bank of China. In 1984 a fourth SOCB, 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, was established. By the mid-1990s these 
large specialized SOCBs – often referred to as the “big four” – accounted for over 60% 
of the PRC’s banking assets. 
The first joint stock banks were formed in the early 1980s, when banks such as South 
Sea Bank (a private bank prior to 1949) and the Bank of Communications were 
launched.5 This was followed in 1994, by the establishment of three specialized “policy” 
banks, the Agricultural Development Bank of China, the China Development Bank, and 
the Export-Import Bank of China. Whereas joint stock banks were characterized by 
smaller state shareholding and faced a greater risk of bankruptcy, the specific objective 
of the three policy banks was to reduce the commercial banks’ role in financing 
development projects (Lin and Zhang, 2009). Accountability to shareholders and 
depositors provided joint stock banks with a greater incentive than SOCBs to engage in 
prudent lending (Jia, 2009). They also enjoyed significant policy support in growing 
their loan books, especially after 2013 when the large SOCBs began to reduce their 
loan growth. Their growth also highlighted a funding constraint as smaller joint stock 
and city commercial banks do not enjoy the nationwide deposit raising networks of  
the larger SOCBs. As a result they became increasingly reliant on inter-bank funding 
(BIS, 2016). Another notable feature has been the reorganization and restructuring of 
the China Post and Savings Bank. This has allowed it to engage in commercial lending 
since 2007, a move that saw it become the country’s fifth largest banking organization 
                                                
4  A full account of financial restructuring during this period can be found in Donnithorne (1967). 
5  Previously these banks were nearly all subsumed within the PBC though they remained as institutions  
– e.g., South Sea, Po Sang, Young Brothers and Yieh Yieh all retained overseas branches in  
Hong Kong, China, but they were for all intents and purposes part of the PRC mono banking system. 
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(Tobin, 2012). Its rural branch network has to some extent compensated for the decline 
of rural credit cooperatives and branch consolidation of the large SOCBs. 
A distinguishing feature of the PRC’s banking reforms is the low presence of foreign 
banks. This contrasts sharply with the experience of other transitional economies such 
as Hungary and Poland where foreign banking assets accounted for more than half  
of total banking assets after a decade of reform (Bonin et al., 2010: 856). After the 
relaxation of geographical restrictions on their operations after 2006, the market share 
of foreign banks grew to 2.1% in 2008 (Table 1). From 2007, foreign banks were 
allowed transform their mainland branches into locally incorporated banks. By 2015, 
some 37 solely funded foreign banks with 306 branches and subsidiaries were locally 
incorporated. As part of this they were required to allocate RMB 100 million (around 
US$ 16 million) in freely convertible currencies transferred from the parent bank. 
Capital injections were also treated as foreign direct investments, effectively increasing 
the complexity of the approval process. Consequently, the presence of foreign banks 
remains low at just 1.3% of assets in 2015. To reverse this decline, the requirement  
to allocate a certain amount of freely convertible currency was relaxed in 2015  
(Xinhua, 2014). 
Table 1: Market Share (by Assets) of Major Banking Institutions (2003–2015) 
 2003 2005 2008 2010 2013 2015 
SOCBs 57.9 56.1 51.6 49.2 43.3 39.2 
Joint stock banks 10.7 11.9 14.0 15.6 17.8 18.5 
City commercial banks 5.3 5.4 6.5 8.2 10.0 11.4 
Rural commercial banks    2.9 5.6 7.6 
Rural credit coops 9.6 8.4 8.3 6.7 5.7 4.3 
Foreign banks  1.5 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.3 
Postal savings bank 3.2 3.7 3.5 3.7 4.1 4.2 
Source: CSRC Annual Report 2015. 
While foreign banks have had a relatively low domestic presence, PRC banks have 
been increasing their international activities, becoming an increasingly important 
source of international credit. By the end of 2015, their cross-border assets accounted 
for some US$ 722 billion, making them the tenth largest creditor in the international 
banking system and a significant supplier of US dollar credit (BIS, 2016: 7). However, 
unlike other larger international creditors like the UK, Japan and Germany, the PRC  
is a net debtor in the international financial system. This is partly to do with the 
unique role of Hong Kong, China; where PRC banks have listed subsidiaries on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange and operate the market in renminbi deposit accounts  
and bonds (Tobin, 2016). Consequently, the cross-border liabilities of Mainland 
banks amounted to US$ 944 billion at the end of 2015, a significant proportion  
(US$ 320 billion) of which related to the market value of the banks’ traded equity in 
Hong Kong, China (BIS, 2016). 
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3.1 Non-performing Loans, Stock Market Listings and Deferred 
Structural Reforms 
The PRC’s revival of commercial banking has not been trouble free. A combination of 
poor lending practices and a lack of experience in managing risk left the banks in a 
poor financial position. The well-known consequence of this was a rapid growth in the 
level of NPLs. Official estimates put the NPL ratio at 33% in 2000 while an S&P (2004) 
estimate which included impaired loans and off-balance sheet loan guarantees put  
the ratio closer to 50%. The PRC responded by launching a bank bailout amounting  
to 3.1% of GDP in 1998. It also established four state-owned asset management 
companies (AMCs) to absorb almost RMB 1.4 trillion in bad loans.6 In February 2004, 
the Law on Bank Regulation and Supervision was amended to give greater power to 
the CBRC as a prudential regulator of banking standards. This was followed by the 
international listing of three of the four large SOCBs between 2005 and 2006. The 
fourth bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, was listed in 2010. By the end of 2017, 39 
banks were listed on the stock markets, usually in Shanghai and Hong Kong, China 
(Table 2). This approach, which involved integrating international best-practices where 
appropriate and equity investments from international banks and institutions has been 
described as an incremental transactional model in the sense that it did not seek to 
immediately replicate international banking models (Pistor, 2009). 
Table 2: People’s Republic of China Listed Banks 
 
Year 
Established 
Year 
of IPO 
Total Assets  
(30 September 
2017,  
*30 June 2017) 
Capital 
Adequacy  
Ratio (%)  
(30 September 
2017, 
 *30 June 2017) 
NPL 
Ratio (%)  
(30 June 
2017) 
Number of 
Employees 
(2016) 
Number 
of 
Outlets 
(2016) 
5 large commercial banks         
Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC)  
1984 2006 25,764,798 14.67 1.57 461,749 17,200 
China Construction Bank (CCB)  1954/1979 2005 22,053,943 14.67 1.51 362,482 14,985 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)  1951/1955/ 
1979 
2010 20,923,117 13.40 2.19 496,698 23,692 
Bank of China (BOC)  1912/1979 2006 19,422,438 13.87 1.38 310,042 11,556 
Bank of Communications (BOCOM)  1908/1987 2005 8,935,790 13.87 1.51 92,556 3,350 
Postal savings bank        
Postal Savings Bank of China 
(PSBC)  
2007 2016 8,764,955 12.73 0.82 169,735 40,000 
9 national joint-stock commercial 
banks  
       
China Industrial Bank (CIB) 1988 2007 6,406,993 11.99 1.60 54,208 2,003 
China Merchants Bank (CMB)  1987 2002 6,169,239 15.01 1.71 70,461 1,819 
Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank (SPDB) 
1993 1993 6,063,837 11.82 2.09 52,832 1,843 
China Minsheng Bank Corporation 
(CMBC) 
1996 2009 5,712,525 11.84 1.69 56,168 3,003 
China CITIC Bank (CITIC) 1987 2007 5,536,973 11.75 1.65 58,023 1,465 
China Everbright Bank (CEB) 1992 2010 4,030,414 12.67 1.58 42,250 1,122 
Ping An Bank (PAB) 1987 1991 3,137,481 11.28 1.76 36,885 1,072 
Huaxia Bank (HXB) 1992 2003 2,445,789 12.45 1.68 39,093 886 
China Zheshang Bank (CZB)  2004 2016 1,488,969 12.38* 1.39 11,305 171 
continued on next page 
                                                
6  One AMC was created for each of the big four commercial state-owned banks: China Great Wall Asset 
Management for the Agricultural Bank of China, China Orient Asset Management for the Bank of China, 
China Huarong Asset Management for the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and China Cinda 
Asset Management for the China Construction Bank. 
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Table 2 continued 
 
Year 
Established 
Year of 
IPO 
Total Assets  
(30 September 
2017,  
*30 June 2017) 
Capital 
Adequacy  
Ratio (%)  
(30 September 
2017, 
 *30 June 2017) 
NPL 
Ratio (%)  
(30 June 
2017) 
Number of 
Employees 
(2016) 
Number 
of 
Outlets 
(2016) 
16 city commercial banks         
Bank of Beijing (BOB) 1996 2007 2,275,226 11.44 1.18 14,534 503 
Bank of Shanghai (BSH)  1996 2016 1,759,999 13.27 1.16 10,149 315 
Bank of Jiangsu (BJS)  2007 2016 1,737,566 10.95 1.43 14,409 541 
Bank of Nanjing (BNJ)  1996 2007 1,144,671 12.88 0.86 8,348 162 
Shengjing Bank (SJB)  1997 2014 938,711* 12.10* 1.53 4,925 190 
Bank of Ningbo (BNB)  1997 2007 953,064 12.14 0.91 15,000 312 
Huishang Bank (HSB)  1997 2013 812,678* 12.42* 1.07 9,089 406 
Bank of Hangzhou (BHZ)  1996 2016 797,772 12.71 1.61 6,176 191 
Bank of Tianjin (BTJ)  1996 2016 659,885* 11.64* 1.46 6,441 337 
Bank of Jinzhou (BJZ) 1997 2015 644,012* 10.97* 1.06 4,482 n.a. 
Harbin Bank (HRB)  1997 2014 546,927* 12.02* 1.65 7,931 355 
Zhongyuan Bank (ZYB) 1948 2017 458,010* 11.82* 1.85 12,956 439 
Bank of Guiyang (BGY)  1997 2016 432,932 11.65 1.46 5,716 289 
Bank of Zhengzhou (BZZ)  1996 2015 431,801 12.08* 1.38 3,773 n.a. 
Bank of Chongqing (BCQ)  1996 2013 408,766 12.81 1.25 4,023 136 
Bank of Qingdao (BQD) 1996 2015 281,976* 13.67* 1.69 3,326 13 
8 rural commercial banks        
Chongqing Rural Commercial 
Bank (CQRCB) 
1951 2010 875,377 13.15 0.97 16,245 n.a. 
Guangzhou Rural Commercial 
Bank (GZRCB) 
1998 2017 615,752 12.11 1.73 7,099 624 
Jilin Jiutai Rural Commercial 
Bank (JTRCB)  
2008 2017 187,841 12.24 1.59 5,941 395 
Changshu Rural Commercial 
Bank (CSRCB)  
2001 2016 142,409 11.88 1.29 5,025 142 
Wuxi Rural Commercial Bank 
(WXRCB)  
2005 2016 130,179 12.26 1.31 1,352 73 
Jiangyin Rural Commercial 
Bank (JYRCB)  
1953 2016 107,307 13.11 2.45 1,419 36 
Rural Commercial Bank of 
Zhangjiagang (ZJGRCB)  
2001 2017 95,664 13.40 1.97 1,897  
Wujiang Rural Commercial 
Bank (WJRCB)  
2004 2016 87,433 13.45* 1.71 1,427 75 
Sources: Compiled by authors with data from KPMG (2017), PWC (2017a), Bloomberg and banks’ financial statements. 
The drawback of this approach was that it left intact the Leninist type control structures. 
While these were conducive to centralized regulation, and ensured that there were 
limited personal connections or crossing of career paths between bank and industrial 
CEOs, they ultimately failed to improve the allocation of capital (Heilman, 2005; Lin, 
2016). A lack of structural reforms in the financial sector also contributed to the build-up 
of macroeconomic imbalances (Ito and Volz, 2013).  
The costs of deferring structural reforms became especially apparent following the 
2008–2009 fiscal stimulus. This was not strictly a “fiscal” stimulus, since most of it 
consisted of bank loans and local government investment rather than central 
government expenditure. State-owned banks were instructed to lend to fund the bulk of 
the state’s stimulus package. Bank managers had little autonomy to resist government 
lending priorities, and they knew that based on experience, they would be rescued 
(Goodstadt, 2012). Much of this lending went to local government “financing platforms”. 
These were technically prohibited as they involved, albeit indirectly, local government 
borrowing (Figure 5). The overriding policy goal of the stimulus meant that bank loans 
to these platforms were implicitly tolerated. By the end of 2010, there were 6,576 of 
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these platforms, a majority of which operated at the county level, and their debt 
balances accounted for 46.4% of local government debt (NAO, 2011). Their connection 
to the banking system meant that local government debt became a source of risk for 
bank balance sheets. Bank finance is the main source of debt funding for local 
government, accounting for some 78% of loans in 2012 (NAO, 2013). Some local 
governments have also turned to more expensive trust loans, while trusts have also 
invested capital in financing platforms. 
Figure 5: Typical Structure of a Local Government Funding Platform 
 
Source: Compiled by authors based on IMF (2013: 4). 
3.2 The Emergence and Growth of Shadow Banking 
While the 2008–09 fiscal stimulus brought to the fore the stability issues surrounding 
off-balance sheet financing, trust and investment companies first played a role in 
responding to the pressing need to finance local development in the early 1980s. In 
1986, state banks were required to shift their trust business to separate companies, 
which were thereafter subject to stricter regulations (Lardy, 1998: 73). However their 
asset base continued to expand rapidly until the mid-1990s, before the PBC started to 
exercise closer control over their operations. The unprecedented decision of the PBC 
in 1994 to restrict lending to the MoF for the budget deficit was also a factor in driving 
the increase in the proportion of off-balance sheet finance (Lardy, 1998). In this way 
shadow banking emerged in the PRC to capture the off-balance sheet business of 
formal banks. The term came to represent a pejorative film for all non-bank financial 
intermediation after 2008, thus obscuring the true nature of risk and usefulness as a 
source of non-bank funding for small firms (Tsai, 2016). 
The PBC’s acknowledgement that state-owned banks had participated in creating large 
amounts of off-balance sheet liquidity drew increasing attention to the visibility of risk 
on their balance sheets (PBC, 2011). The PBC sought to deal with this by adjusting the 
reserve requirement ratios of banks so that their capital ratios would more adequately 
reflect the level of off balance sheet lending. It led the PBC to adopting a wider 
monetary aggregate – namely total social financing (Table 3). This reflected the fact 
that between 2002 and 2010, the average annual growth of the all system aggregate 
was 27.8%, while the average annual growth of bank loans was 18.4% (PBC, 2011). 
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Table 3: The Components of Total Social Financing 
On Balance Sheet Off Balance Sheet  
Renminbi loans by financial institutions Entrusted loans (in which the bank acts as a loan 
intermediary) 
Foreign currency denominated loans Trust loans (involving the repackaging and sale  
of loans as wealth management products) 
Stock markets and net financing of 
corporate bonds 
Undiscounted bankers’ acceptances (a form of  
off-balance sheet bank draft guaranteed by the bank) 
Others: e.g., micro financing   
Source: Compiled by authors. 
The growth in off-balance sheet lending coincided with a reduction in the role of FDI in 
capital formation. This fell from a pre-financial crisis of 6.8% for the years 2005–07 to 
3.0% for the years 2011–2016 (UNCTAD, 2017). PRC banks had long benefited from a 
surplus of deposits over loans as the PBC purchased foreign exchange from banks 
(Sun, 2015). The declining role of FDI has placed pressure on domestic sources of 
bank funding forcing banks to turn to off-balance sheet wealth management products 
(WMPs) to fund their activities. WMPs are financial products that offer higher returns 
than conventional equity or deposit accounts. Large SOCBs can purchase WMPs from 
smaller banks in return for funding. SOCBs can also issue their own WMPs to fund 
inter-bank lending to smaller banks. While most do not carry an explicit guarantee,  
their systematic importance in the financial system has earned them a level of public 
confidence. This is illustrated in data from the BIS, which indicated that approximately 
40% of WMP asset portfolios were invested in bond markets with a further 16% 
invested in money market instruments (BIS, 2017: 13). This has led to concern 
regarding the emerging inter linkages between the different components of the financial 
system. In addition, here are numerous opportunities to hide off-balance sheet assets 
in the calculation of risk-weighted capital, making meaningful cross-county comparison 
of acceptable levels of off-balance sheet risk extremely difficult (IMF, 2011).  
A second consequence of the growth in shadow banking has been the emergence of  
a discrepancy between bank lending and liquidity growth. From 2008 onwards, bank 
lending started to outpace the growth in the broad money supply (Figure 6). In 2011, 
the PBC acknowledged that bank lending was no longer particularly useful in 
explaining the growth in M2 and that “all system” or total social financing now played a 
more important role in supporting economic growth (PBC, MPR, Q1 2011). A further 
change in this relationship occurred in 2016 and 2017 as the growth in the broad 
money supply and lending to non-financial began to slow in response to government 
policy, while total social financing continued to expand faster (Figure 7). This indicated 
the continuing channeling of funds off-balance sheet into poorly performing state 
enterprises and funding platforms. 
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Figure 6: Growth in Broad Money Supply vs Bank Credit  
(%) 
 
Source: Compiled by authors using the PBC’s Monetary Statistics. 
Figure 7: Year on Year Growth (%) in Credit to non-financial Corporations 
(NFCs), Total Social Financing (TSF) and M2 
 
Source: Compiled by authors using the PBC’s Monetary Statistics. 
3.3 Interest Rate Reforms, Deposit Insurance and the Moral 
Hazard Problem 
The removal of the lending interest rate cap in July 2013 therefore represented a new 
chapter in the PRC’s financial reforms. It also necessitated a more complex monetary 
framework. In 2013 the PBC introduced a Standing Lending Facility to meet large  
scale demand for long term liquidity and Short-Term Liquidity Operations to facilitate 
repurchase operations with shorter term maturities (Sun, 2015). The reforms, which 
began with a widening of interest rate margins in the 1990s, sought to give banks 
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greater flexibility in the pricing of risk, but limit competition by retaining control over 
deposit rates. This involved a progressive widening of bank lending rates (albeit around 
a narrow range) and the eventual removal of the upper rate in 2004 for all banks 
(except for rural credit cooperatives). On the deposit side, banks were required to 
match the official deposit rate until 2004, when the lower limit was removed. 
In July 2014 the CBRC relaxed its stance on the components used to calculate banks’ 
loan to deposit ratios, a move that effectively allowed banks to expand liquidity. To 
protect against competition leading to a greater frequency of bank failures, the next 
stage, namely the removal of the deposit rate cap, required a system of managed bank 
resolution and deposit insurance. In May 2015, a scheme was implemented which 
stipulated depositors could receive up to RRMB 500,000 in compensation if a bank 
were to collapse. Finally, in October 2015 it was announced that the deposit rate  
cap would be lifted, effectively allowing deposit-taking institutions to compete for 
deposit funds. 
The liberalization of the interest rate and the introduction of a system of deposit 
insurance offered an appealing solution to the pervasive moral hazard problem caused 
by state-ownership of the financial system. Moral hazard has long permeated all levels 
of the PRC’s financial system. SOCBs were willing to lend to large state enterprises 
and local governments on the understanding that were these loans to go bad, they 
would ultimately be bailed out. The moral hazard issue highlights the danger that the 
welfare and efficiency-enhancing benefits of interest rate liberalization – namely an 
extension of credit to private firms and greater financial diversity – may be squandered 
if deposit insurance is not accompanied by wider financial reforms. The latter point is 
important as in theory, smaller joint stock commercial and city banks and potential new 
private banks should be the main beneficiaries of deposit insurance. 
3.4 Consolidation and Policy-driven Diversity 
A consequence of the moral hazard problem in banking, and one which interest rate 
reform should in theory address, is the lack of diversity in financial institutions. A lack of 
diversity carries economic costs. One study found that rural financial services did not 
satisfy the diverse public demand for more sophisticated banking services with many 
provinces lacking even basic banking services (PBC, 2010). It further noted that three 
western provinces had more than 50 counties that were classified as “un-banked”. The 
Rural Household Survey (2014) found that only 27% of demand for loans from the 
PRC’s rural dwellers is met compared to 40% in urban areas. It also found that 
approximately 50% of urban demand for loans for homes is met compared to 25% in 
rural areas. A study by the ADB ranked the PRC 84th among a sample of developing 
and developed economies and 11th among developing Asian economies in a financial 
inclusion index using data for the period 2004–12 (Park and Mercado, 2015). 
The main source of this problem has been the dominance of the SOCBs. While the 
large SOCBs tend to be profitable, there appears little correlation between profitability 
and efficiency and SOCBs tended to operate at decreasing returns to scale (Fezioglu, 
2009). A study using data for the period 1997–2008 found tentative evidence to 
indicate that while the lending practices of large SOCBs did not drive economic growth 
and may have even “crowded out” manufacturing growth, other banks such as policy 
banks have played a role in financing infrastructure and public goods provision 
(Andersson et al., 2016). Jiang et al. (2012) find some evidence to indicate that as a 
multi-layered banking system emerged in the 2000s, the efficiency of all bank types 
including the SOCBs appears to have improved. 
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The PRC’s approach to improving financial diversity has focused on using policy 
directives and mixed ownership, rather than outright privatization. This is consistent 
with the view that there exist a variety of different owners from state to private (OECD, 
2015; World Bank, 2014). It recognizes that large banks are in effect financial 
oligarchies and the inherent conflicts between shareholders and depositors in  
non-mutual financial institutions led to a too big to fail problem (Mullineaux, 2013). In 
certain circumstances depositors might have preference for state over private banks 
(Adrianova et al., 2008). Indeed most of the controlling shareholders of the joint-equity 
banks, which have been key to reducing the market share of the SOCBs, are SOEs 
and local institutions (Jia, 2009). 
While interest rate reforms have introduced market incentives for a more diverse 
financial system, state policy and administrative measures have been more successful 
in promoting consolidation as a means of reducing the dominance of the large  
state-owned banks. An example of this was the consolidation of troubled rural credit 
cooperatives (RCCs). These locally owned financial institutions had a history of poor 
credit management and governance practices during the 1990s (Huang, 2008). 7 
However they provided a vital source of finance for farmers as larger banks often find it 
unprofitable to operate below the country level. The consolidation of Shanghai’s 232 
rural credit cooperatives led to the establishment of one single bank, the Shanghai 
Cooperative Bank. Since 2011, the PBC has set differentiated favorable reserve 
requirements for agricultural and rural financial service related lending (Sun, 2015). 
The restructuring and expansion of rural financial institutions has also continued and by 
end-2016 the PRC had 1,114 rural commercial banks and 1,443 township banks. 
Foreign banks have also played a role in promoting financial diversity in the rural 
sector, albeit within the constraints of capital controls. Since December 2003, foreign 
banks have been allowed far greater opportunities to conduct local currency business 
and the number of cities where foreign banks could handle RMB business was 
increased from nine to 13. The extension of a pilot scheme in 2006 effectively removed 
geographical restrictions on the operations of foreign banks in rural areas. Interestingly 
this has gone hand-in-hand with a decline in the asset share of foreign banks (Table 1), 
but has seen large international banks such as HSBC implement a multi-level  
city-district rural level expansion model via its wholly-owned subsidiary HSBC Rural 
Bank (Tobin, 2012). By 2015, foreign banks had a presence in 69 cities in 
27 provinces, with 17% of outlets located in the North East, Middle and West of the 
PRC (PBC, 2016: 47). 
The expansion of foreign banks into less banked areas illustrate both the role of policy 
directives and the challenges of funding bank expansion at the local level. This is borne 
out in efforts to promote the entrance of private capital. By the end of 2015, the PRC 
had launched five private pilot banks, which were mostly located in Eastern Provinces 
and municipalities such as Zhejiang, Tianjin, Shanghai, Wenzhou and Qianhai. Their 
location indicates that they are mainly targeted at the PRC’s growing private sector.  
But in this sense, they suffer from similar drawbacks to foreign banks. The latter  
have tended to cluster around financial centers and cities, particularly Shanghai and 
the Special Economic Zones, areas already geographically well served by financial 
institutions (Meng, 2009). The expansion of private banks expansions is also heavy 
constrained by their reliance on non-deposit funding sources. Their deposits 
                                                
7  RCCs were established at the township level from 1951 onwards as part of the rural cooperative 
movement (Zhao, 2010). By 1955, more than 150,000 had been established. In 1958 RCCs were 
integrated into the Agricultural Bank of China (which was later integrated into the PBC) before becoming 
independent institutions again in 1996. For an overview of reforms of RCCs since the mid-1990s see 
Zhao (2010) and Xie (2003). 
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represented some 30.6% of their funding, suggesting a heavy reliance on non-deposit-
based funding for expansion (PBC, 2016:43). The pilot private banks had a loan book 
totaling RMB 23.6 billion. This represented just a fraction (0.023%) of total loans 
The cumulative effect of these reforms has been a decline in the assets share of large 
state-owned banks, which fell from 57.9% in 2003 to 39.2% by 2015. This coincided 
with a fall in the total number of banking entities, which fell from 19,797 in 2006  
to 4,261 in 2015 (CBRC, 2015). An unintended effect of consolidation, has been 
branch-level rationalization and increasing homogeneity, especially in the strategies of 
the SOCBs. Going forward, the PRC’s State Council and the PBC have approved 
proposals for the adoption of mixed ownership as a way of introducing non-state capital 
into the financial system and improving ownership diversity. An increasing number of 
small and medium sized banks have listed on Hong Kong, China’s stock exchange  
as a means of funding their expansion. In 2015, the Postal and Savings Banks has  
also introduced international strategic investors, including large international banks, 
domestic insurance companies and SWFs in a manner not unlike the initial approach to 
the reform of the large SOCBs in the 2000s. 
4. STOCK MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CENTERS 
The emergence of Shanghai and Shenzhen as the PRC’s main on-shore financial 
centers can be traced to the establishment in 1990 of stock exchanges in both cities. 
Both municipal governments, who oversaw the development of stock markets until the 
late 1990s, followed policies based on equity developmentalism (Green, 2004). This 
involved the use of a range of policy tools to boost trading volumes, attract new listings 
and increase the number of exchange members. The result was a rapid growth in 
market capitalization and listed companies (Figure 8 and Table 4). While Shanghai has 
benefited from being the location of choice for foreign banks and the listing destination 
for large SOEs, Shenzhen’s competitive advantage has tended to come from its tax 
and cost competitiveness. This has made it more attractive for small and medium 
enterprises and venture capital. Recently both cities have benefited from national level 
policies promoting pilot Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and Stock Connect schemes. The 
former were designed to allow controlled off-shore currency trading for PRC banks and 
foreign financial institutions. Shanghai’s FTZ was launched in 2013. The Stock Connect 
schemes allowed approved overseas investors purchase domestic shares via Hong 
Kong, China’s off-shore financial market. Shanghai was the first to benefit from this in 
2014 and the scheme was extended to Shenzhen in 2016. The developments have 
seen Shanghai and Shenzhen emerge as the world’s 6th and 20th largest financial 
centers respectively by 2017 (Yeandle, 2017).  
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Figure 8: Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Indices Annual Closing Level  
1992–2016 
 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from PBC Financial Stability Reports, various years. 
Table 4: Selected Measures of the Role of the People’s Republic of China’s  
Stock Markets (1990–2015) 
Year 
Number of 
Listed 
Companies 
Market 
Capitalization 
(billion RMB) 
Ratio of 
Stock 
Financing 
to Loans 
Market 
Capitalization 
to GDP  
(%) 
Traded Market 
Capitalization 
to GDP  
(%) 
1990 10 – – – – 
1992 53 104.8 – 3.9 – 
1993 183 353.1 4.96 10.2 2.5 
1995 323 347.4 1.27 5.9 1.6 
2000 1,088 4,809.1 11.5 48.0 16.2 
2005 1,381 3,243.0 2.05 18.0 5.8 
2010 2,063 26,542.2 11.3 67.0 48.5 
2014 2,613 37,254.6 4.76 59.0 49.6 
2015 2,827 53,130.4 7.09 78.5 61.8 
2016 3,052 50,824.5 15.3 68.3 52.8 
Source: Compiled by the authors with data from the People’s Bank of China and China Securities and Regulatory 
Commission. 
Rapid development has also left unresolved challenges. There remains a very high 
level of liquidity within PRC society and by the end of 2015 over RMB 1,841 billion of 
this was on deposit at banking institutions. Both the traded capitalization and ratio of 
stock finance to loans remains low (Table 4). The absence of alternative forms of 
quality investment especially during the 1990s (land and property in particular) added 
novelty value to share ownership but did not necessarily increase the choice of 
investments available to investors. The majority of the 3,052 companies listed at the 
end of 2016 were SOEs (Table 4). Trading patterns remain highly erratic. The average 
turnover ratio of shares on the Shanghai stock market was some 388% in 2015, while 
the market had a price earnings ratio of 17.6%. High turnover levels and comparatively 
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high valuations implies that the increase in market activity has been driven by a small 
but relatively affluent group of individual shareholders who own comparatively small 
portions of total equity. By 2015 the number of accounts had grown to over 214 million, 
but the ratio of new to existing accounts remains volatile. The data show that in 2008, 
as the market indices collapsed, some 34 million accounts were closed (Table 5). Many 
accounts are thought to be inactive or duplicate.8 The diffused nature of shareholders 
mitigates the possibility of a credible takeover threat. 
Table 5: Selected Indicators of Share Ownership 
Year 
Ratio 
Tradable to 
Total Shares 
Average 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Shanghai 
Market 
Total Share 
Accounts 
(’000s) 
New Share 
Accounts 
(’000s) 
Ratio of New 
Share 
Accounts  
to Total 
Accounts 
1993 27.8 – 7,776.7 561.0 72.1 
1995 35.5 528.7 12,424.7 183.5 14.8 
2000 35.7 492.9 58,011.3 1319.2 22.7 
2003 35.4 250.7 69,926.6 142.3 2.0 
2005 32.8 274.4 73,360.7 1,203.3 1.6 
2008 37.2 392.5 104,490.9 –34,379.3 –32.9 
2009 62.0 499.4 120,376.9 15,886.0 13.2 
2010 72.7 197.6 133,910.4 13,533.5 10.1 
2015 78.6 388.5 214,775.7 72,628.9 33.8 
Source: Compiled by the authors with data from the China Securities and Regulatory Commission. 
The potential of both Shanghai and Shenzhen to offer a more sophisticated range  
of financial products is also hindered by a lack of a fully convertible renminbi (RMB) 
and capital controls (cf. Section 7). Notwithstanding these drawbacks, there are  
some salient aspects of the PRC’s shareholding reforms. As will be discussed below, 
concessions on overseas access and foreign share ownership have seen domestic 
PRC shares added to the Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets Index (MSCI) while the 
split share reform has provided a politically acceptable way of reducing the proportion 
of non-traded shares. In the absence of full capital account liberalization, Hong Kong, 
China and other off-shore renminbi settlement hubs have provided a safe channel to 
facilitate the entrance of foreign via quota-based allocations. In this sense, controlled 
internationalization has often provided a vital means of overcoming bottlenecks to the 
development of the domestic market. 
4.1 A Politicized Regulatory Framework 
Informal SOE share issues and (authorised) over-the-counter (OTC) trading started  
in the PRC in the mid-1980s. When the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets  
started operations in December 1990 they were initially without central government 
supervision. One implicit intention in establishing the formal stock exchanges was to 
legitimate the flourishing stock trades in informal kerb markets (Liu and Green, 2003). 
The CSRC was not established until October 1992. Its establishment was mainly in 
response to scandals and riots triggered by stock market irregularities. Initially, the 
                                                
8  Officials estimate that the real number of investors is around half the official number with investors using 
multiple accounts to for illegal share deals. See The Economist (2003) and FT (2003). 
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CSRC had little authority and it faced criticism from other bodies such as the National 
People’s Congress which in 2002 accused the CSRC of being responsible for presiding 
over the listing of unqualified companies, the falsification of financial statements, and 
insider trading (FT, 2002). Attempts by the CSRC to de-list companies were subject to 
political intervention and a lack of transparency.9 This remained the case until 1999, 
when the first reasonably comprehensive Chinese Securities Law became effective. 
The number of listed companies is controlled by the regulator. In practice this favors 
large SOEs. Indeed listed SOEs differ from the conventional understanding of a state 
enterprise in that they have undergone partial privatization through the policy of share 
issue privatization or the share ownership scheme. Privatization was partial, with  
the state being the single largest block holder in most listed state enterprises. The 
proportion owned by the state tends not to be freely traded and explains the difference 
between the ratio of market capitalization (which includes traded and non-traded 
shares) to GDP and the ratio for traded shares. Shares of listed SOEs were divided 
into three categories, usually about one-third each. These were tradable shares which 
were sold to the public; legal person shares – typically held by a state-owned parent 
company and in principle non-tradable; and non-tradeable shares held by the state. 
Tradeable shares were further divided into A-shares which were traded in domestic 
currency and B-shares designed for foreign investors and traded in foreign currency 
(US dollars in Shanghai). The separation from the more liquid domestic market meant 
that B-shares tended to have lower valuations and small trading volumes. In 2001, the 
B-share market was opened to domestic investors. However, this failed to stimulate 
interest in the market and by 2016 there were just 100 listed B-shares. 
The politicized regulatory framework also had an important effect on investor 
sentiment. Investors perceived that once a listed firm got into financial difficulties, it 
would receive government support. This is illustrated most forcefully in the case of the 
soaring share prices of firms put into “special treatment” category or “special transfer” 
categories. After 1998, firms with two years of continuous losses or other problems 
were placed in the “special treatment” category and were subject to five percent limits 
on their daily share price movements. After July 1999, firms with three years of 
continuous losses were put into “special transfer” category. In 2000, five of the 
companies with the worst balance sheets for 1999 were among the top 10 performing 
B-shares (SCMP, 2001). 
4.2 From “One-third Privatization” to the “Split Share Reform” 
At the outset of the PRC’s stock market development, at least two-thirds of the capital 
of most of the PRC’s listed firms were not freely floated on the stock market. Table 5 
shows that the ratio of non-tradable to tradable shares remained just above 30% until 
2008. This effectively meant “one-third” privatization and no meaningful change in 
ownership. One-third privatization meant that one of the main benefits of privatization 
for state-enterprises (i.e., the achievement of a hard budget constraint) was not 
realized (Sun, 2003). In the absence of a hard budget constraint and with few checks 
on their behavior, some SOE managers were able to privatize enterprise assets, 
leaving the original state company as holder of liabilities. Subsequently, the SOE 
declared bankruptcy, defaulting on existing financial obligations in what Lardy (1998) 
termed false bankruptcy. 
                                                
9  The CSRC was criticised for not de-listing Zhengzhou Baiwen when the local government threw its 
political weight behind the firm to keep it afloat (SCMP, 2001). 
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Efforts to reform the overhang of non-tradable shares were often frustrated by market 
volatility as individual investors feared that the market would be flooded with low quality 
A-shares. For example a failed effort to float non-tradable A-shares in 2001 led to a 
significant collapse in the Shanghai and Shenzhen composite indices (Figure 8). The 
2001 collapse provided the impetus for a more focused approach to resolving the 
overhand of non-traded shares by increasing the participation of foreign investors and 
adopting a more gradual approach to the pricing of non-traded shares. Beginning in 
2002, foreign investors – who are licensed by the CSRC – were permitted to purchase 
and sell tradable A-shares through the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) 
scheme and non-tradable share via a series of reforms to the Mergers and Acquisitions 
rules during 2002–2004 (Lee, 2008). The effect of these reforms was that by the time 
the split share reform was launched on a trial basis in September 2005, foreign 
investors had two tracks through which they could purchase domestic shares. The split 
share reform ameliorated many of the agency costs of small information and control 
disadvantaged tradable shareholders that plagued earlier reform efforts, by allowing  
for negotiation between tradable and non-tradable shareholders to determine the 
appropriate compensation level (Yeh et al., 2009). Its overall effect was a rapid change 
from one-third to two-third privatization and by 2015 the ratio of tradable to non-
tradable shares stood at 78%. 
Although the split share reform has been successful in resolving the overhang of  
non-tradeable shares overseas holdings of PRC equity remain low, accounting for 
around 1.3% of total market capitalization at end of 2016. The absence of a feasible 
way of allowing foreign participation in domestic markets also represented a significant 
obstacle to efforts to have the PRC’s tradable A-shares included in the Morgan Stanley 
Emerging Markets Index (MSCI). The index is used by most large money managers 
and funds and inclusion has the potential to increase the demand for A-shares as well 
as providing a significant vote of confidence in the PRC’s equity markets. MSCI 
inclusion requires exchanges to reach certain thresholds of accessibility, transparency 
and liquidity. In June 2017, it was announced that 222 eligible A-share stocks  
(a weighting of around 0.7% of the MSCI index in 2018) would be admitted to MSCI 
index beginning in May 2018, with access provided through the Hong Kong, China 
based Stock Connect scheme (SCMP, 2017b). Although this represented a scaling 
back of a 2016 plan to include some 448 qualifying stocks, the decision opens the 
possibility of an increased weighting subject to future market reforms. 
4.3 Hong Kong, China’s Role  
Hong Kong, China’s “off-shore” money market has long represented the PRC’s 
financial interface with the rest of the world (Tobin, 2011). Listing on Hong Kong, China 
provided enterprises with a means of raising funds and bonding themselves to higher 
corporate governance standards (Sun and Tobin, 2009). The attractiveness of  
this approach is illustrated in the fact that between 1993 and 2017, some 229 PRC 
enterprises listed H-shares on Hong Kong, China’s stock exchange. Other state 
enterprises incorporated subsidiaries in Hong Kong, China and were listed as “red 
chips”. The first PRC SOEs to list in Hong Kong, China in 1993 were mostly industrial 
enterprises did so at a time when PRC markets were in their infancy. In the 2000s all of 
the PRC’s big four state-owned banks were listed in Hong Kong, China. More recently 
Hong Kong, China’s stock exchange has been used by smaller provincial level banks 
such as Harbin Bank, Bank of Zhengzhou and the Bank of Tianjin. This has offered 
smaller banks a useful way of mitigating domestic funding constraints as well as 
attracting international shareholders.  
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More recently Hong Kong, China’s roles has evolved as described previously to allow 
foreign investors a route into the A-share market (the north bound route) and domestic 
PRC investors an option to invest in Hong Kong, China shares (the south bound route) 
via the stock connect scheme. Both routes are subject to daily quotas and restrictions 
on beneficial ownership. Hong Kong, China has also offered a useful platform to 
expand on the qualified investors scheme. In December 2011, a pilot programme was 
launched to allow fund management companies approved as RMB Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (RQFII) to use their RMB funds raised in Hong Kong, China to 
invest in domestic securities markets. This mitigates against the prospect of capital 
outflows. In 2013 the scheme was extended to London. While the initial QFII scheme 
was viewed as a watershed reform in the opening of the PRC’s securities markets to 
foreign investors, its extension to include RMB raised in Hong Kong, China and other 
off shore currency markets is indicative of the cautious quota-based approach to 
allowing foreign capital into the PRC’s financial centres and the dilemma faced by the 
PRC in implementing capital account reforms. 
5. BOND MARKETS 
Domestic PRC government and corporate bonds are traded on the country’s two stock 
exchanges (mainly Shanghai), OTC and, most importantly, in the inter-bank bond 
market. The exchange-based market is an order-driven market. Its participants include 
securities companies, insurance companies, securities investment funds, trust and 
investment companies, credit cooperatives, other non-financial institutional investors, 
and individual investors. As mentioned above, bonds have also become a major 
component of WMPs. Banks often use securities companies to manage the proceeds 
of WMPs, while securities companies themselves often use repo agreements to sustain 
bond prices (BIS, 2017). Capital account controls and a limited pool of off-shore  
RMB liquidity have meant relatively few international issues of PRC government bonds. 
Their relative scarcity has meant that such bonds tend to be highly sought after. 
Nevertheless, liquid markets for government debt are a prerequisite for foreign 
residents to hold part of a government debt and exercise their judgement on the 
solvency of the country concerned (Noyer, 2015). As the following section shows, a 
combination of domestic market opening and capital account controls have created a 
trade-off between the on-shore and off-shore markets. 
Much of the early growth of the PRC’s bond markets was motivated by the demands 
that financing economic growth placed on central and local government. During the 
1980s, government bonds, issued by the MoF, were placed as a form of taxation, and 
were not tradable. Using bonds as a form of finance also brought with it some 
problems, especially the growth of unregulated issues. While the government made 
good on many of them, it also clamped down severely on new non-MoF bond issues. A 
case in point and one that had important implications for international investors 
emerged following the default by Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corp 
(GITIC) in 1998 on interest payments on a bond. GITIC also offered a first insight into 
how difficult it had become for Beijing both to finance local investment and retain 
oversight and control over financial institutions at the local level (Tobin, 2011). 
The international trust and investment corporations which were established at local 
level during the 1980s to help accelerate local government development benefited from 
special exemptions from central government control. Their difficulties raised immediate 
question over whether the PRC government would stand behind the huge debts of the 
PRC’s regional investment companies. Subsequently the PRC government introduced 
greater regulatory controls designed to ensure that corporations issuing bonds in the 
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future would be able to cover due interest payments. Bond issues by the MoF climbed 
steeply after 1997 as part of a fiscal stimulus plan designed to prevent sharp economic 
contraction in an environment characterized by long-lasting deflation (1996–2003).  
This feature was again apparent following the 2008–09 fiscal stimulus, with local 
governments making use of funding platforms to issue debt (see above). What stood 
out about these funding platforms was that they were effectively bonds in all but name 
in the sense that they were set up to finance specific projects, mostly infrastructure 
related. Repayment generally comes from project revenue streams, bank loans or local 
government land sales and subsidies. 
The PRC’s corporate bond market remains largely restricted to state corporations. 
Corporate bond issues fell sharply in the early 1990s, but have started to rise again in 
recent years. For much of the 2000s the market was heavily dominated by government 
securities. Since 2015 the paying down of foreign currency loans has witnessed  
the increasing issue of domestic bonds as corporations restructure their debts. The 
scope for corporate bonds has expanded since 2005 when firms were allowed issue 
short term commercial paper for the first time (Naughton, 2007). By 2014 short term 
financing bills accounted for 4.1% of bond issues (PBC, 2015). As of June 2017, the 
government bond market had reached a total volume of RMB 37,159 billion or 47% of 
GDP, while the corporate bond market stood at RMB 14,771 billion or 19% of GDP 
(Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Development of the People’s Republic of China’s Local Currency Bond 
Market in Billion RMB (Left Axis) and as Share of GDP (Right Axis) 
 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from AsianBondsOnline. 
Going forward, some form of municipal bond market would appear most consistent  
with the state’s reform agenda. This would offer the opportunity to break the dominant 
role of loan financing from state-owned banks in local government finance. That said,  
a functioning municipal bond market seems some distance off. Most municipal 
governments lack the type of fiscal transparency and regulations required to sustain 
market development. In this sense bonds were always going to work better for more 
affluent provinces with stronger fiscal positions. In 2014, Guangdong and Shandong 
became the first provinces in the PRC to issue municipal-style bonds, as part of 
reforms intended to tackle rapid growth in local government debts. While these reforms 
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represent a positive step forward in local government financing, they favor revenue rich 
coastal provinces. 
Less clear is the future direction of off-shore bond issues. The off-shore market has 
long had a far smaller pool of liquidity to draw on than the on-shore market. RMB 
denominated (Dim Sum) bonds issued in Hong Kong, China provided a short term 
solution to this. A RMB devaluation and a decline in off-shore renminbi deposits  
served to highlight the limited settlement options and RMB liquidity of the off-shore 
market. Capital controls made it difficult for domestic PRC issuers to repay off-shore 
bonds. Consequently, RMB Dim Sum bond issues in Hong Kong, China fell from  
RMB 300 billion in 2014 to RMB 130 in 2016 (SCMP, 2017c). A liberalization of access 
restrictions for foreign financial institutions in 2016 made it easier for them to participate 
in the on-shore market. That said, just as in the case of equities, international investors 
accounted for only 1.2% of the onshore bond market at the end of 2016 (SCMP, 
2017c). 2016 also saw the first offshore renminbi sovereign bond issued by the MoF 
outside of the PRC on the London Stock Exchange. Other countries such as Poland 
have issued so called Panda Bonds which are denominated in RMB. Tight control over 
settlement, normally conducted through overseas PRC state-owned banks, indicates 
that the market for these bonds remain short of a fully liquid market for government 
debt. 
6. FINTECH 
The PRC’s financial-technology (or fintech) industry – i.e., the application of internet-
based technology within the financial services industry – has been flourishing. As  
of January 2018, eight of the 28 global fintech companies with a valuation exceeding 
US$ 1 billion are from the PRC, and nine when including Hong Kong, China 
(TechCrunch, 2018). The rise of fintech in the PRC has benefited from an 
underdeveloped banking sector which, as discussed, has failed on delivering financial 
inclusion and therefore provided an opportunity for fintech companies. It also benefited 
from an initial light-touch approach regarding regulation and a technophile population 
with 772 million internet users, 98% of which use mobile devices (CNNIC, 2018). 
Arguably, PRC fintech companies have also benefitted from effective protection that 
limits the scope of foreign tech companies to operate in the PRC. 
Fintech in the PRC comprises seven areas: payments and e-wallets; supply chain  
and consumer finance; peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms; online funds; online 
insurance; personal finance management; and online brokerage (Mittal and Lloyd, 
2016). The PRC is world-leading in many of these areas. Notably, it has developed the 
world’s biggest markets for digital payment and online lending (The Economist, 2017). 
Mobile payments have grown rapidly in the PRC (Figure 10). In 2016, PRC consumers 
spent RMB 157.55 trillion (US$ 22.8 trillion) via mobile payment platforms, compared to 
only US$ 112 billion in the United States (Wang and Dollar, 2018). Estimates suggest 
that mobile payment transaction reached almost RMB 200 trillion in 2017. In 2016,  
over 90% of mobile payments were made with apps developed by Alibaba’s Alipay 
(54%) and Tencent’s TenPay (37%), the PRC’s two leading fintech firms (Wang and 
Dollar, 2018). 
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Figure 10: Transaction Volume in the People’s Republic of China’s  
Mobile Payments Business (RMB trillion) and Year-to-year Percentage  
Change (Right Axis) 
 
Source: Wang and Dollar (2018), based on data from the PBOC. 
Online lending in the PRC is dominated by peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, which has been 
developing in the PRC since around 2010. In 2017, the transaction volume of P2P 
lending reached RMB 2.8 trillion (Figure 11). P2P online platforms connect borrowers 
directly with lenders (or investors), who can get higher returns than the interest rates 
they get with conventional banks. The number of P2P lending platforms increased 
rapidly from about 200 in 2012 to a peak of almost 3,500 in November 2015. Given 
P2P lending operated in a regulatory vacuum until 2016, it is not surprising that the 
market included a large number of rogue schemes. By the end of 2015, more than a 
third of all P2P platforms were considered “problem platforms” that had either stopped 
repayments, were investigated by the police, or whose operators had disappeared with 
lenders’ money (Chorzempa, 2016). The most prominent P2P Ponzi scheme was the 
supposed P2P platform Ezubao, which attracted US$ 7.6 billion from nearly one million 
lenders in only 18 months, before it was found out that 95% of its borrowers were fake 
(Wang and Dollar, 2018). In April 2016, a “rectification campaign” was launched to 
“probe legal compliance and limit risks in Internet finance”, followed by the introduction 
of comprehensive CBRC regulation in August 2016 imposing caps on P2P borrowing 
and prohibiting P2P platforms to act as financial intermediaries (Chorzempa, 2017). 
The CBRC regulation also caps the size of online loans at RMB 1 million for individuals 
and RMB 5 million for companies, requires lenders to use a custodian bank, and 
forbids platforms to guarantee the principal or the interest on loans they facilitate 
(Wang and Dollar, 2018). Since the introduction of regulation of P2P lending, the 
number of P2P platforms has fallen significantly, to less than 2,000 by the end of 2017. 
Despite the market consolidation, the transaction volume has continued to increase at 
a rapid pace, to RMB 2,805 billion (US$ 442 billion) at the end of 2017. The PRC 
therefore accounts for about three-quarters of global online lending (PWC, 2017b). 
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Figure 11: Transaction Volume of P2P Online Lending Platforms  
(RMB billion) 
 
Source: Wang and Dollar (2018), based on data from Wang Dai Zhi Jia. 
7. EXCHANGE RATE MANAGEMENT  
AND FINANCIAL OPENING 
The RMB exchange rate has been tightly managed by the People’s Bank of China 
(Figure 12). In January 1994, the PRC unified its dual exchange rates, devalued the 
RMB by 33% overnight and pegged it to the US dollar at 8.7. From August 1994 
onwards, the RMB gradually appreciated against the dollar until May 1995. It was then 
kept firmly at 8.3 RMB/US$ until July 2005, when the PBC allowed for a modest 
appreciation against the dollar of 2.1% and announced that it would adopt “a managed 
floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference  
to a basket of currencies” (PBC, 2005). The RMB was subsequently allowed to 
strengthen, not least in response to massive pressure from the US and other major 
trading partners who complained about “currency manipulation”. In July 2008, in the 
face of the Global Financial Crisis, the PBC effectively reinstalled the dollar peg, this 
time at 6.8 RMB/US$. In June 2010, the peg was abandoned and the PRC returned to 
a strategy of increasing currency flexibility, with a gradual widening of daily trading 
bands. The RMB continued to strengthen up to a high of 6.1 RMB/US$ in January 
2014. Net capital outflows since mid-2014 caused the RMB to depreciate up till the  
end of 2016. Various reasons were behind this, including the slowdown of the PRC 
economy and doubts about the country’s future growth prospects; a growing 
importance of outward direct investments by PRC firms; PRC firms’ repayments of their 
dollar debt; but also capital flight. The PBC responded by tightening capital controls 
and by heavily intervening in the foreign exchange market to strengthen the RMB. As a 
result, the PRC’s foreign exchange reserves declined by nearly a trillion US$ from a 
peak of US$ 3.99 trillion in June 2014 to US$ 2.998 trillion in January 2017. The PRC’s 
foreign exchange reserves had built up rapidly since the early 2000s (Figure 13) on the 
back of large and growing capital account surpluses and recurrent foreign exchange 
intervention aimed at keeping the RMB competitive. 
  
ADBI Working Paper 825 Tobin and Volz 
 
26 
 
Figure 12: RMB/US$ Exchange Rate, January 1993–December 2017 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors with data from the Pacific Economic Exchange Rate Service. 
Figure 13: The People’s Republic of China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves  
(in US$ 100 million), 1990–2017 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors with data from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. 
Throughout, PRC authorities have maintained tight capital controls, which enabled the 
PBC to manage the exchange rate while at the same time allowing a reasonable 
degree of monetary policy independence (Reade and Volz, 2012). Capital controls 
have also permitted the government to keep a tight grip on the financial sector. The 
PRC has taken cautious steps in liberalizing cross-border financial flows since the early 
2000s. As discussed, since 2002, foreign investors have been allowed to buy and  
sell RMB denominated shares in the PRC’s mainland stock exchanges through the 
QFII scheme. Commercial credits inflow and outflow restrictions were lifted in 2013. 
However, cross-border investment by individuals remain tightly controlled.  
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The slow pace of domestic financial reform and the continued presence of widespread 
capital controls have been an impediment to the internationalization of the RMB, a goal 
that the PRC has pursued since 2009 (Volz, 2014). Figure 14 shows that while foreign 
holdings of domestic financial assets such as equities, bonds and loans have remained 
low for the reasons described earlier, the PRC did succeed in creating a large pool of 
off-shore RMB. Currency devaluation and capital controls have seen a substantial 
reduction in this since 2014. As the pervious sections indicated this reduction may have 
a knock-on effect on the prospects for increasing the overseas holdings of equities  
and bonds. 
Figure 14: Domestic Renminbi Financial Assets Held by Overseas Entities,  
2013–16 (100 million Yuan) 
 
Source: Peoples Bank of China, Monetary Statistics. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The PRC has come a long way in developing its financial system, and it has done so at 
a speed that has been breathtaking. the PRC’s “big four” banks (ICBC, CCB, ABC, 
BOC) are now the four largest banks in the world by assets, while another 14 PRC 
banks make it into the top 100 largest banks (Mehmood, 2017). Her bond market  
is the third largest after the US and Japan. The PRC has also become the world’s 
leading nation in the area of fintech, with the biggest market for digital payment and 
online lending. Moreover, the PRC’s efforts to promote the RMB as an international 
currency have already resulted in the inclusion of the RMB in the International 
Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights basket, where it joined the dollar, the euro, 
the Japanese yen and the British pound in 2016. While this reflects the incredible 
growth and development success the PRC has achieved over the last four decades, 
caution is warranted. Indeed, the rise of the PRC’s banks is somewhat reminiscent of 
the rise of Japanese banking institutions, which in 1989 entirely occupied the list of the 
10 largest banks in the world (Chicago Tribune, 1989). For Japan, the rapid expansion 
and internationalization of its financial system proved a challenging and costly 
experience. The current PRC leadership has started to deal with these challenges. 
While it remains committed to the goal of establishing Shanghai as a global financial 
center and develop the RMB into a truly global currency, it has become increasingly 
conscious of the dilemmas posed by an open capital account. Indeed, efforts to 
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internationalize the RMB have been slowed down recently with the reinforcement of 
stricter capital controls. 
While this account has illustrated that the development of the PRC’s financial system 
has tended to mirror closely developments in the international system, the PRC now 
faces major challenges in terms of financial stability emanating from its enormous level 
of debt and the enormous size of its shadow financial system (e.g., Song and Xiong, 
2018). An optimal scenario for PRC policymakers is a managed unwinding of 
counterparty obligations involving the restructuring and diversification of corporate debt 
alongside the creation of a more diverse financial system. Thus far, policy has focused 
on debt-for-equity swaps with indebted state enterprises. Debt-for-equity swaps imply 
that state banks will in the absence of broader financial market reform carry the risk of 
these restructurings on their balance sheets. This is likely to further constrain their 
ability to allocate credit to productive uses in the corporate sector. Debt-for-equity 
restructuring also increases the urgency of corporate governance reform in equity 
markets. Weak governance continues to present a significant limitation on restructuring 
as banks face significant governance obstacles in monitoring repayment. In the 
absence of further reform, equity markets themselves also appear poorly placed to 
absorb significant amounts of debt. 
Another major challenge, which has received growing attention of PRC financial 
authorities, is the alignment of the financial system with sustainable development. 
While progress has been made since 2012, when the CBRC first issued Green Credit 
Guidelines “for the purpose of encouraging banking institutions to, by focusing on 
green credit, actively adjust credit structure, effectively fend off environmental and 
social risks, better serve the real economy, and boost the transformation of economic 
growth mode and adjustment of economic structure” (CBRC, 2012), for the time being 
the vast majority of lending and investment does not sufficiently take into account 
environmental and climate risk (UNEP Inquiry, 2017; Volz, 2018). These risk are 
amongst the greatest systemic medium- and long-term challenges facing the PRC 
economy, and the financial sector ought to play a leading role in mitigating them. 
Moreover, the PRC is facing the challenge of aligning the interests of society and  
the financial sector. The status of the sector more generally has been undermined by 
malpractices in the lead up to the recent Global Financial Crisis. For the PRC these 
challenges are arguably intensified by the transition process and the need to 
accommodate the needs of an increasingly affluent society. 
Overall, the PRC has come a long way in developing its financial system, which has 
played a crucial role in supporting the economy’s investment-driven growth model. But 
some of the very factors that have helped this rapid development are now proving to be 
a liability for the future.  
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